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Padilla’s Collateral Attack Effect on
Existing Federal Convictions
BY: RACHEL A. CARTIER
I. INTRODUCTION

for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.10

n Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court stated “[i]t
is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that
no criminal defendant–whether a citizen or not–is left to
the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”1 This is particularly important today because, in 2008, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement “removed”2 97,1333 “known criminal
aliens”4 from the United States.5 “Criminal aliens” are noncitizens with deportable offenses
such as: crimes of moral turpitude;
multiple criminal convictions; aggravated felonies; high speed flight;
failure to register as a sex offender;
certain drug offenses; certain firearm offenses; espionage/sabotage/
treason; domestic violence; stalking;
child abuse; violations of protective orders; crimes against children;
trafficking; failure to register or falsification of documents; and terrorist activities.6 As of June 2009, there
were 94,498 aliens in state and federal custody, making up 4.1 percent
of the total in-custody population.7
Recent U.S. Census Bureau statistics show over twenty-one million
non-citizens residing in the United
States, and it is unclear as to how many have deportable convictions on their records.8 As the Supreme Court has indicated,
non-citizens are entitled to the same constitutional protections
as citizens regarding legal representation.9
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:

The U.S. Supreme Court built upon the Sixth Amendment in
Strickland v. Washington and held that counsel must meet the
performance standard of “reasonably effective assistance.”11 In
order to succeed on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the defendant has the burden of proof to
show that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below the “reasonably effective counsel” standard;12
and (2) there is a “reasonable probability” that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.13
On March 31, 2010, the U.S.
Supreme Court once again expanded
the reach of the Sixth Amendment
and held in Padilla v. Kentucky that
counsel has an obligation to advise
their clients of possible immigration consequences upon entering
guilty pleas.14 They further held that
a failure to do so constitutes “ineffective counsel” and thus can render
a plea agreement constitutionally
invalid.15 The Supreme Court did
not clarify whether Padilla would
be applied retroactively to existing convictions, but the Court did state, “[it] now hold[s] that
counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk
of deportation,”16 and “[i]t seems unlikely that [their] decision
today will have a significant effect on those convictions already
obtained as a result of plea bargains.”17 The Supreme Court’s
vagueness has resulted in a split in U.S. courts as they grapple
with the language in Padilla, as well as existing case precedents
to determine whether this is a “new rule” that should be applied
retroactively.18
This uncertainty could have a profound impact because in
2009, guilty pleas made up 96.3 percent of the convictions in
U.S. district courts.19 Courts now have to balance the finality of
convictions against defendants’ constitutional rights. This piece

I

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district where in the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
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will analyze who can raise Padilla as a collateral attack to an
existing federal conviction.20 It will first examine the opinion
of Padilla, whether and to what extent Padilla should be applied retroactively to federal convictions, the procedural hurdles
in place for collaterally challenging a federal conviction, and
whether a defendant would want to raise this collateral attack. It
will conclude by determining the likelihood of whether Padilla
“will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains.”21

II. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
Jose Padilla had lived lawfully in the United States for forty
years as a permanent resident.22 Mr. Padilla was then charged
in Kentucky with transportation of a large amount of marijuana
and drug distribution.23 His counsel told him not to worry about
deportation consequences because he had lived in the country
for so long.24 Mr. Padilla then pled guilty to the drug distribution offense and subsequently faced deportation.25 Mr. Padilla
claimed he would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty
had he known the charge put him at risk for deportation.26 The
Kentucky Supreme Court denied Mr. Padilla’s post-conviction
relief on the grounds that deportation is a “collateral” consequence of a conviction, and as such, the Sixth Amendment does
not protect defendants from erroneous advice regarding deportation consequences.27
The U.S. Supreme Court started its analysis with an overview of immigration law and the changes that have increased the
chances of deportation because of a criminal conviction.28 Now
there is a broad class of deportable offenses and judges have
limited authority to prevent deportation.29 The Court specifically pointed out that in 1996, Congress eliminated the Attorney
General’s authority to grant discretionary relief to aliens facing
deportation, thereby making deportation “practically inevitable”
for those with deportable offenses.30 This high likelihood of deportation means it is more important now than ever for counsel
to advise their clients regarding potential consequences.31 Deportation is “sometimes the most important part of the penalty”
imposed on non-citizens.32
Responding to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that it does not distinguish between direct and collateral consequences for the purpose of Strickland’s
“reasonably effective counsel” requirement.33 The Court stated
it was not important to make this distinction due to the intimate relationship between deportation and the criminal process,
which makes it uniquely difficult to classify the consequence as
direct or collateral.34 Therefore, Strickland applies to situations
where counsel must brief a client who is about to enter a plea
with potential immigration consequences.35
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In determining whether a counsel’s failure to a client of
immigration consequences fell below Strickland’s “reasonably
effective counsel” requirement, the Court recognized that the
weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that
counsel must advise his or her client of potential immigration
consequences, including the right to remain and the right not to
be excluded from the United States.36 The Court held that affirmative wrong advice is as bad as no advice and that counsel
must at least advise their client there may be adverse immigration consequences.37
In addition, the Supreme Court stated it considered the importance of protecting the finality of guilty plea convictions.38 It
recognized that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral
challenges than convictions, accounting for only thirty percent
of habeas petitions filed while nearly ninety-five percent of all
criminal convictions result in the filing of habeas petitions.39
The Court, therefore, did not feel that this ruling would open
the floodgates to challenges of convictions obtained by plea
bargains.40 It ultimately held that counsel must inform a client
of whether his plea carries a risk of deportation, and Mr. Padilla
proved that his counsel was constitutionally deficient because
she did not inform him of potential immigration consequences.41
As such, the case was remanded to the lower court to determine
whether Mr. Padilla had been prejudiced and was thus entitled
to have his conviction overturned.42

III. EFFECT ON COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON
FEDERAL CONVICTIONS
The road through appeal is a long one.43 If a defendant
wants to challenge a conviction, the defendant must file under
the direct appeal process, exhausting all of the appropriate avenues.44 Once that is complete, a defendant may file a collateral
challenge to their conviction.45 Collateral attacks are separate
“quasi-civil” proceedings from the direct appeal, usually filed
with the original trial court.46 Only constitutional claims or
those resulting in a serious miscarriage of justice are “cognizable” on collateral attack.47 Ineffective counsel implicates the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and would thus qualify as a
constitutional claim.48

A. DOES PADILLA APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO
EXISTING CONVICTIONS?
Since 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court has presented “confused and confusing” jurisprudence with regard to the retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure.49 Padilla appears to be no different. Reasonable
jurists are split with respect to whether Padilla should apply
retroactively,50 with the lower courts divided.51 The language
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of Padilla offers some insight into the Court’s opinion on the
“floodgates” theory:
We confronted a similar “floodgates” concern . . .
but nevertheless applied Strickland . . . [a] flood did
not follow in that decision’s wake . . . [s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task . . . [i]t
seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained as
the result of plea bargains.52
These statements indicate that the Court considered the potential
floodgates concerns and had determined that the constitutional
right to receive effective counsel
outweighed the need for finality. On
the other hand, the Court states: “[l]
ikewise, although we must be especially careful about recognizing new
grounds for attacking the validity of
guilty pleas. . . .”53 Further, “we now
hold that counsel must inform her
client whether his plea carries a risk
of deportation”54 because “our longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation
as a consequence of a criminal plea,
and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully
in this country demand no less.”55
This conclusion indicates that an attorney’s duty to inform a client of immigration consequences
is a “new rule,” and only at this point have deportation consequences become inevitable enough to warrant their inclusion
during the plea bargaining process. These statements are powerful but unclear, leaving the courts little guidance in determining
whether Padilla should be applied retroactively.56

It is admittedly difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule. . . . [H]owever, a case announces
a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a
new obligation on the States of the Federal Government. . . . To put it differently, a case announces a new
rule if the result was not dictated by precedent at the
time the defendant’s conviction became final.61
Courts are split as to whether Padilla announced a “new rule”
or just applied a well-established principle under Strickland.62
The Supreme Court provided an exception for “new rules”
to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review “only if
(1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a ‘watershed rul[e]
of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”63 A rule is substantive when
“it alters the range of conduct or
the class of persons the law punishes,”64 and it is procedural when
it regulates the “manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.”65 A rule is “watershed” only
if it satisfies two requirements: (1)
“[i]nfringement of the rule must
‘seriously diminish the likelihood
of obtaining an accurate conviction,’”66 and (2) “the rule must
‘alter our understanding of the
‘bedrock procedural elements’ essential to the fairness of the
proceeding.’”67

Courts are split as to

whether Padilla announced

a “new rule” or just applied
a well-established principle
under Strickland.

1. What precedential case law does this U.S.
Supreme Court provide to determine whether
a rule of criminal procedure should be applied
retroactively?
In Teague v. Lane,57 the U.S. Supreme Court outlined the
analysis to determine whether a rule applies retroactively, which
is “unwavering in use today.”58 Teague holds old rules should
be applied retroactively to cases on direct or collateral review;59
however, “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will
not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.”60 The question then becomes
whether or not the case announced a “new rule.” The Court
acknowledged:
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i. Does Padilla’s holding constitute a “new rule”?
In determining whether something is a “new rule,” the U.S.
Supreme Court stated in Williams v. Taylor that the courts must
determine whether they applied a well-established constitutional principle that has been considered precedent, and if not,
it is a new rule.68 A rule will be considered a “new rule” if it
imposes a new obligation on the states or federal government
that falls outside the universe of federal law.69
In Butler v. McKellar, the Supreme Court applied its test
of determining a “new rule” and held the bar to police-initiated
interrogation following a suspect’s request for counsel in a
separate investigation, set forth in Arizona v. Roberson,70 was
a “new rule.”71 Even though the Court in Roberson stated it
was directly controlled by Edwards v. Arizona, which bars police initiated interrogation after the defendant invokes his Fifth
Amendment right,72 the Butler decision “is not conclusive for
purposes of deciding whether the current decision is a new rule
under Teague.”73 The Court further acknowledged that there was
a “significant difference of opinion on the part of several lower
courts that had considered the question previously.”74 This inFall 2010

dicated that there was “debate among reasonable minds”75 and
that “it would not have been illogical or drudging application of
Edwards to decide it did not extend to the facts of Roberson.”76
Due to the fact that there was not strong precedent, the Court
held that the Roberson rule applying a defendant’s single invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to all matters77 was a “new
rule” and thus did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
attack.78
Since 2002, six of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have
all clearly held that potential immigration consequences were
collateral consequences of a plea, and therefore, counsel had
no constitutional obligation to advise a non-citizen client of the
possible immigration consequences prior to the client entering
a plea.79 In United States v. Fry, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that as of 2003, all other circuits to address the
question of “whether or not counsel performs deficiently by
failing to advise a defendant of immigrations consequences”
have found that deportation is a collateral consequence; thus,
counsel has no duty to advise a client of immigration consequences.80 The debate as to whether immigration consequences
fell under the requirements of due process or the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure occurred even though the Court found
it is the “weight of the prevailing norms” that requires counsel
to advise their client of potential immigration consequences.81
Like Butler, it seems that “reasonable minds” could disagree,
and therefore this should constitute a “new rule.”82
In addition, as articulated in Williams,83 this holding does
impose a new responsibility on the federal government because
federal defenders will be now required to advise their clients
of potential immigration consequences upon entering a guilty
plea.84 This same obligation could also be forced upon federal
court judges.85 Therefore, Padilla constitutes a “new rule” and
would not be applicable to cases on collateral review unless it
fell into the “watershed rule” exception.86
ii. If it constitutes a “new rule,” does it fall into the Teague
“watershed rule” exception?
In fourteen separate cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has
been asked to determine whether or not a rule is “watershed,”
and fourteen times the Court has not applied the exception.87
In Teague, the Supreme Court stated that the Gideon v. Wainwright right to counsel for indigent defendants for a serious
crime88 would constitute a watershed rule.89 The Supreme Court
stated, “[w]e have repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of
the second Teague exception, explaining that ‘it is clearly meant
to apply only to a small core of rules requiring observance of
those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.’”90 Furthermore, “any qualifying rule ‘would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt [that it is]
unlikely that many such components of basic due process have
yet to emerge,’”91 thus “it should come as no surprise that we
Criminal Law Brief

have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague
exception.”92 Although Padilla involves the Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel, it is unlikely to constitute a “watershed rule” because the Supreme Court has yet to find one and
has issued strongly worded opinions against them.93
iii. Assuming Padilla is an old rule or a “new rule” that
fits into an exception under Teague, how far back should
Padilla apply retroactively?
The Supreme Court stated in 1996 that deportation became
“practically inevitable”94 for those with a deportable criminal
conviction because that was when “Congress . . . eliminated
the Attorney General’s authority to grant discretionary relief
from deportation.”95 Therefore, it could be presumed that prior
to 1996, deportation was not “practically inevitable”96 for aliens
convicted with deportable offenses. It would also follow that
only after deportation became “practically inevitable”97 would
attorneys have a duty to advise their clients of potential immigration consequences. Therefore, a reasonable conclusion
would be that only defendants with convictions post-1996
would be able to use Padilla to collaterally attack those convictions, greatly reducing the number of federal convictions that
could be collaterally attacked.

B. DOES A CONVICTION FAIL THE TWO-PRONG TEST
SET FORTH IN STRICKLAND?
The first prong of the Strickland test requires the court to
find that the petitioner was not advised of immigration consequences; however, the Court stated that the duty to inform has
been a part of the professional responsibility of counsel for at
least the past fifteen years, according to professional norms.98
Therefore counsel benefits from a presumption that it has satisfied this obligation when advising their clients of plea consequences.99 This responsibility puts the burden on the defendant
to prove that he was not advised of potential immigration consequences. This burden could be very difficult since not all conversations between an attorney and her client are on the record,
and most attorneys are probably unwilling to sign declarations
stating that they did not warn their clients of potential immigration consequences.
The second prong compels a petitioner to “convince the
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances.”100 This requirement allows
courts to evaluate the original plea agreement to determine
whether the defendant could have received a better offer or in
light of the evidence and very real deportation possibilities, decided to go to trial instead. The Court recognized that this could
take a significant amount of analysis from the lower courts,
acknowledged that these courts were “now quite experienced
with applying Strickland,”101 and decided to “effectively and
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efficiently use its framework to separate specious claims form
those with substantial merit.”102

C. DOES A CONVICTION MEET THE PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS?
After a defendant has completed the direct appeal process,
the defendant can file a collateral challenge to his or her conviction.103 In order to proceed on the collateral challenge, the
defendant has to meet any procedural requirements set forth in
the applicable statute or case law.104 The most common type of
federal post-conviction remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, and
there is a “related but distinct” rarely used writ of coram nobis
as well.105

1. Writ of Habeas Corpus
Under 28 U.S.C. 2254, a defendant can file an application
for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court on the ground
that he or she is in custody in violation of the U.S. Constitution.106 The term “in custody” has been liberally construed to
require only that the defendant is still completing a part of their
sentence, which can include probation.107
28 U.S.C. 2255 does provide for a one-year statute of limitations from:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment
to making a motion created by governmental action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the movant was prevented from
making a motion by such governmental action; (3)
the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.108
If Padilla sets forth a “new rule,” then defendants have until
March 31, 2011, one year after the decision, to challenge their
convictions. If it is an old rule, then defendants have one year
from the date of their original conviction.
A writ for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the
applicant has exhausted all of his remedies in the state court,
there is an absence of available process, or circumstances are
such that they render the process ineffective.109 The defendant
has to make sure that he has exhausted all of these remedies.
The applicant has to prove that the lower court’s decision
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States”110 or that his claim relies on “a new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collat62

eral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable . . . .”111 The defendant would be able to demonstrate his
claim by proving his or her case was out of compliance with
Padilla and Strickland, and thus he or she suffered an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

2. Writ of Coram Nobis
The writ of coram nobis112 is “an extraordinary remedy”
that allows a petitioner to attack an unconstitutional conviction
after the petitioner has served his or her sentence and is no longer in custody.113 There is no statute of limitations for the writ of
coram nobis.114 The writ should be granted “only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.”115 The Ninth
Circuit requires a petitioner to prove the following to qualify for
coram nobis relief:
(1) a more usual remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons
exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse consequences exist from the conviction to satisfy the case and controversy requirement of Article III; and (4) the error suffered is
of the most fundamental character.116
A writ of coram nobis is filed after a defendant has served
his sentence117 when a more usual remedy is unavailable. The
petitioner is responsible for establishing that valid reasons existed for not attacking the conviction earlier and that he sustained sufficiently adverse consequences to satisfy Article III’s
case and controversy requirement. This threshold question
could require that the petitioner show that actual deportation
proceedings are underway to meet this requirement. Petitioner
would be able to rely on Padilla and Strickland to prove that the
error he suffered is of the most fundamental character.

D. DOES THE PARTY REALLY WANT TO OVERTURN
THEIR CONVICTION?
The Supreme Court in Padilla recognized those “who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain
obtained as a result of the plea”118 and “the challenge may result
in a less favorable outcome for the defendant.”119 Defendants
voluntarily agree to enter plea agreements, and a petitioner who
collaterally challenges his agreement and has it set aside could
easily be forced to go to trial to face much stiffer penalties.
Although the Court in Padilla stated “informed consideration
of possible deportation can only benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants during the plea-bargaining process,”120 it appears that the government could have the upper hand, which
could leave defendants to the mercy of the prosecutor.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If courts decide to apply Padilla retroactively, it will only
affect a small number of convictions. Padilla requires the conviction be (1) post-1996; (2) of a non-citizen; (3) convicted of
a deportable offense; (4) who can prove that he or she was not
advised of potential immigration consequences; (5) who is now
facing immigration/adverse consequences such that he or she
has standing; (6) that he can meet the procedural requirements
for their choice of remedy (habeas corpus or writ of coram
nobis); and (7) he is willing to give up the benefit of his or her
plea agreement in an attempt to get a better deal. Unless previous witnesses or evidence is unavailable, there is nothing to
suggest that prosecutors will be willing to bargain for pleas that
avoid immigration consequences, especially since there is no
easy way out with so many deportable convictions.121 Therefore,
trial is the most likely option for any plea deemed constitutionally invalid, and chances of success are uncertain at best.
Whether Padilla applies retroactively or not, the Supreme
Court was correct in stating “[i]t seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions
already obtained as the result of plea bargains.”122 It does not
appear as though the “floodgates”123 will open, filling the courts
with writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis. At the same time,
the Supreme Court achieved its goal in protecting non-citizens
from the “‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”124 At the very
least, it established a solid precedent across the United States regarding the advisement of potential immigration consequences,
if not a “new rule” all together.
CLB
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